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American Medical Association's Code of Ethics. 
- vi -
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This brief contains three sections. The first responds to the hospital's 
arguments that the trial court made reversibly erroneous evidentiary rulings in 
favor of Mrs. Haase. The second argues that the trial court made erroneous 
rulings prejudicial to Mrs. Haase. The third contains Mrs. Haase's reply 
arguments in support of her request for judgment in the amount of $820,000, as 
supported by the jury's post-verdict affidavits and in-court declarations. 
SECTION ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR FAVOR OF MRS. HAASE. 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
PORTIONS OF THE SURGEON'S PERSONAL MEDICAL 
RECORDS. 
A. . . . Because The Admitted Records Were the Best Evidence of 
What a Member of The Hospital's Medical Staff. Credentialinq 
Committee. Medical Executive Committee and Governing Board 
Knew Concerning the Surgeon's Impairments and Drug 
Dependencies. 
A central issue in this case was what the hospital knew or should have 
known concerning the surgeon's physical limitations, emotional disorders and 
drug dependencies. The hospital's entire argument concerning Dr. Madsen's 
treatment records grandly ignores the fact that at the time the surgeon was 
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credentialed, Dr. Madsen was a member of the hospital's Medical Executive 
Committee, Credentialing Committee and Governing Board. (R. 227, 656, 660; 
973-74; 1104-05). Throughout the entire time the surgeon operated at the 
hospital, Dr. Madsen was his primary care physician and a member of the 
hospital's medical staff. What Dr. Madsen knew was therefore chargeable to the 
hospital. Dr. Madsen himself acknowledged that: the confidential nature of 
physician/patient communications must yield when disclosure is necessary to 
protect the public interest or the welfare of an individual; a physician has an 
ethical obligation to report an impaired colleague to the hospital's chief of staff; 
and a physician involved in granting hospital privileges has an ethical duty to be 
guided primarily by concern for the safety of patients. (Tr. 1099-1103; See also 
AMA's Code of Ethics). 
If the hospital didn't know what Dr. Madsen knew, it should have known. If 
it was ignorant, its ignorance was the fault of its own agent and medical staff 
member. 
Dr. Madsen 's testimony and chart reveal that Dr. Madsen was aware of 
the impairments documented and quantified during the last few years of the 
surgeon's service as an orthopedic surgeon in the U.S. Army.1 Dr. Madsen's 
1
 During the first office visit on May 4,1993, Dr. Hawkes delivered to Dr. 
Madsen his medical records from the military. Dr. Madsen read those records. 
Although the court did not allow those records to be admitted, it did allow Dr. 
Madsen to be questioned concerning them. Dr. Madsen acknowledged, based 
on review of the military records, that in February of 1989, Dr. Hawkes was 
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testimony and chart also shed shockingly bright light on the surgeon's sad 
condition from early May of 1993 through the date he operated on Mrs. Haase in 
March of 1996.2 
receiving disability compensation from the military due to: limited motion in 
cervical spine; limited motion in lumbar spine; paralysis of upper radicular nerve 
group; shoulder condition, left upper; shoulder condition, right upper; limited 
motion of forearm, left upper; loss of motion of thumb, right upper. The records 
reflect residual vision problems due to"Homer's Syndrome" which "causes him 
difficulty driving at night due to depth discrepancies, and is more pronounced with 
fatigue, causing some difficulty towards the end of an operation". The records 
also state: "Dr. Hawkes is a pediatric orthopedic surgeon who is definitely 
restricted in his medical activities because of his multiple service connected 
injuries". The records state that due to subluxation and restriction of motion in his 
hand and fingers, "both thumb and index finger are symptomatic and make 
problems when he's operating". (Tr. 1106-1110). 
2
 On May 4, 1993, Dr. Madsen learned that the surgeon: 
suffered from significant chronic pain and the severe, recurrent migraine 
headaches "associated with nausea, vomiting and inability to concentrate"; 
experienced numbness and tingling in his right arm and chronic pain in 
both shoulders, low back, feet and knees; 
had used "multiple pain medications" for his problems and was self-
administering Demerol in addition to Fiorinal #3 and Restoril; 
had promised his wife that he would no longer self-administer narcotics; 
had been rated 90% disabled by the armed services; and 
was taking hypertension medication. 
In his own assessment of the surgeon, Dr. Madsen listed several maladies 
including: migraine headaches, chronic pain stemming mainly from cervical disk 
disease, multiple orthopedic related problems, a history of pulmonary injury, 
hepatic cysts . . . , rheumatoid arthritis, and hypertension. 
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Because Dr. Madsen's patient chart on the surgeon contained the best 
evidence of what he knew concerning the surgeon's condition and provided the 
only reliable means of testing the truthfulness of his testimony, it would have 
been reversible error for the trial court not to have allowed introduction of those 
treatment records. 
On his first visit, Dr. Madsen gave the surgeon a prescription for 60 Fiorinal 
#3 tablets with 2 refills. On July 1,1993 - less than 60 days later, the surgeon 
requested another prescription of this opiate narcotic drug. He asked Dr. 
Madsen to prescribe Demerol vials but Dr. Madsen declined because he had 
been given those from other surgeons and was self-administering the medication. 
Nine days later, Dr. Madsen approved the administration of 100 mg of Demerol. 
Nine days after that - on May 24, he administered 150 mg of Demerol to the 
surgeon. Three days later he again administered 150 mg of Demerol. These 
administrations of Demerol continue on June 9 and June 10. Following the June 
10 administration, Dr. Madsen made arrangements for the surgeon's son to drive 
him home because he "didn't want him operating the car under the influence of 
that injection". Seven days later, the surgeon requested and received another 
shot of Demerol as he did five days later. The surgeon received four injections of 
Demerol in June of 1993. He also received prescriptions for Fiorinal #3 with 2 
refills. (120 doses in total). The Demerol administrations continued with great 
frequency. 
The surgeon had high blood pressure at each visit. He was also put on anti 
depressant medication. His hypertension continued despite his being placed on 
Cardizem and, later, Procardia. The surgeon also received prescription sleeping 
medication (Ambien) which Dr. Madsen acknowledged could exacerbate and 
amplify the sedating properties of the narcotic pain medication he continued to 
take. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 12;Tr. 976-1106) 
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B. The Hospital Failed to Object at the Time the Court Granted Mrs. 
Haase's Offer to Admit the Records And. Therefore. Waived 
Whatever Objection it Had. 
The relevant pages of Dr. Madsen's treatment records on the surgeon were 
first offered into evidence on the third day of trial, March 13. (Tr. 542-543). The 
trial court declined to receive the records at that time, indicating their having 
finally been produced did not make them admissible, without the accompanying 
testimony of the physician who created them. (Tr. 543). The court stated:"... I 
think the doctor's got to testify about them". At that time, the hospital's counsel 
stated: "Your Honor, you've expressed my objection brilliantly. Thank you." (Tr. 
543). When Dr. Madsen took the stand to testify the following Monday, the 
relevant portions of his chart were again offered into evidence. (Tr. 592). The 
hospital again objected and the court indicated it would withhold a ruling until 
satisfied that sufficient foundation had been established through Dr. Madsen's 
testimony to warrant admission of the records. Dr. Madsen's testimony covers 
the next 145 pages of the trial transcript. At the conclusion of his testimony, the 
records were again offered into evidence. At this time, the hospital made no 
objection. (Tr. 1118). Apparently, the hospital was as convinced as the court 
that the necessary foundation for admission of the records had been established 
by Dr. Madsen's testimony. In any event, the hospital waived whatever objection 
it still may have had by failing to object at the time the court granted Mrs. Haase's 
offer to admit the records. 
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C. The Hospital Knew What the Records Contained Nearly Three 
Years Before the Case Got to Trial and Their Late Production 
Prejudiced Mrs. Haase. Not the Hospital. 
The hospital contends the trial court erred in allowing reference at trial to 
the surgeon's personal medical records because "the defense had no opportunity 
to review the records or depose the physician who created them" (Brief of 
Appellee/Cross Appellant, p.7). It states: 
The release of the records was so untimely as to create 
unfair prejudice. It allowed the Hospital no opportunity 
to depose Dr. Madsen regarding his records or even to 
discuss the records with him informally prior to his 
testimony. 
(Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant, p. 8). These assertions are meritless.3 
The Hospital's representative, Risk Manager Debra Spafford, obtained 
access to and scrutinized Dr. Madsen's records on June 15,1999 - some 13 
months after this action was commenced and nearly 3 years before the case 
came to trial! (Transcript at 981). The hospital was fully aware that Dr. Madsen 
was the surgeon's treating physician from 1993 on. (Ron Perry depo at 43-44; 
trial transcript at 172). Mrs. Haase designated Dr. Ace Madsen as a possible 
3
 As is the hospital's suggestion that the production of Dr. Madsen's 
records was ordered only in "another case". (Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant, 
p. 7). On March 12, 2002, the trial court signed an "Order on Dr. Madsen's 
Medical Records" in this case. That order directed the immediate production of 
Dr. Madsen's treatment records. The order was hand delivered to the hospital's 
counsel on the day it was signed. (R. 983-4). 
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trial witness in the formal Designation of Expert Witnesses her counsel sent to 
the hospital's counsel some 10 months before trial. (R. 496-500, Para.11 ). 
The hospital could have deposed Dr. Madsen at any time and questioned 
him freely concerning his treatment of the surgeon and his knowledge of the 
surgeon's impairments and drug dependencies. It is disingenuous in the extreme 
for the hospital to claim "unfair prejudice" from the late release of Dr. Madsen's 
medical records. If anyone was unfairly prejudiced by the late release of those 
records, it was Mrs. Haase, not the hospital. The hospital was given access to 
those records nearly 3 years before she was. 
D. Reliance on the Records by Mrs. Haase's Credentialing Expert 
Was Only Incidental to His Opinions and Conclusions. 
Dr. Pasternak's review of and comment on the surgeon's treatment records 
was hardly a major factor in the trial. He had concluded the surgeon was 
dangerous and the hospital had breached its duty to Mrs. Haase long before he 
was allowed to review the surgeon's treatment records. (See Dr. Pasternak's 1-
23-02 depo transcript). His additional comments, after reviewing those records, 
as to the red flags they raised were not particularly dispositive. A great quantity 
of strong and compelling evidence, aside from Dr. Pasternak's opinion, was 
presented that the surgeon was indeed impaired and dangerous. (See, e.g., the 
testimony of Dr. William Stryker at Tr. 1263-88). In any event, there was nothing 
preventing the hospital from trying to retain an expert to testify that Dr. Madsen's 
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illuminating treatment records do not reflect treatment of a dangerously impaired 
surgeon. Again, its Risk Manager knew what those records revealed nearly 3 full 
years before the case came to trial. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING 
THE JURY TO HEAR SWORN DEPOSITION 
TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THE SURGEON IN MRS. 
HAASE'S CASE AGAINST HIM BECAUSE SUCH 
TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY ADMISSIBLE UNDER 
SEVERAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
The hospital incorrectly characterizes the trial court's decision to allow the 
jury to hear the prior deposition testimony of the surgeon as a determination of 
law, reviewable for correctness with no deference to the trial court. The 
determination was in reality an evidentiary ruling which required the trial court to 
balance factors pertaining to admissibility. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.. 
977 P.2d 508, 511 (Utah App. 1999). A trial court is to be granted broad 
discretion in its decision to admit or exclude evidence and this court is to 
"presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the 
record clearly shows to the contrary." State v. Morgan. 813 P.2d 1207,1210 n.4 
(Utah App. 1991). In this instance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
The prior deposition testimony of the surgeon which the trial court allowed 
to be read to the jury consisted of statements by the surgeon that: 
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He had significant physical impairments and ongoing problems with chronic 
pain; 
he had obtained a medical disability discharge from the Army while serving 
as an orthopedic surgeon during the Desert Storm conflict shortly before 
starting up his orthopedic surgery practice in Vernal; 
he had received a 90% impairment rating from the Veterans Administration 
based on rheumatoid arthritis; 
he was impaired by restricted range of motion in his right thumb, left ankle, 
neck and lumbar spine; his eyes "are not equal" which "drives me nuts"; 
he was diagnosed as having Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and was 
started on Serotonin uptake inhibitors; 
following his medical disability discharge from the military in 1992, he 
attended a pain management clinic in Provo and another in Salt Lake; 
he underwent neck surgery in Dallas, Texas in February of 1995; 
he fell off a horse while trying to gain admission to a high school football 
game in September of 1995; 
he spent four days at the Wasatch Canyons Day Spring Clinic in the Fall of 
1995, where his treating physician was "the head addictionologist for the 
State"; 
while practicing orthopedic surgery in Vernal, he consumed various 
narcotic drugs on a regular basis including Methadone, Sublimaze patches, 
Zoloft, Deporal, Relafen, Lodine, Prilosec and Ultram. 
(Trial transcript at pp. 444 - 446). 
Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence contain exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. Those found in Rule 803 apply regardless of whether the declarant 
is available as a witness at trial. Those found in 804 apply when the declarant is 
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unavailable. The surgeon's prior deposition testimony is admissible under 
provisions of both rules. 
A. The Surgeon's Statements of His "Then Existing Physical 
Condition" Were Admissible Under Rule 803(3). 
Among statements not excluded by the hearsay rule are statements "of the 
declarant's then existing . . . physical condition (such as . . . pain, and bodily 
health)". Rule 803(3). Any statements made by the surgeon in depositions 
concerning his physical condition, pain or bodily health were expressly admissible 
under this recognized exception to the hearsay rule. 
B. The Surgeon's Statements Against Interest Were Admissible 
Under Rule 804(b)(3). 
When a declarant is unavailable because of death, any statement made by 
him is admissible if it was 
at the time of its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject the declarant to c iv i l . . . liability . . . 
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position 
would not have made this statement unless believing it 
to be true. 
Rule 804(b)(3). The statements Mrs. Haase sought to use in this case were all 
made by the surgeon in cases in which he was a defendant. There would have 
been no motive for the surgeon to have testified untruthfully about his having 
received a 90% disability rating from the VA or that he suffered from a wide 
variety of range of motion limitations and impairments. It was likewise against 
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his interest to reveal the identity of all the heavy prescription medications he was 
taking, to admit that he fell off his horse while attempting to gain access to a high 
school football game, and to acknowledge that shortly after that falling-off-the-
horse-incident, he was admitted at the Day Spring Clinic in Salt Lake. Such 
statements by the surgeon were so far against his own interest that a reasonable 
person in his position would not have made them unless believing them to be 
true. The surgeon had no motive to prevaricate. His statements were therefore 
properly admitted. 
Q. The Surgeon's Statements Were Admissible As Former 
Testimony Under Rule 804(b)(1). 
When a declarant is unavailable because of death, his prior deposition 
testimony is admissible when it was given: 
in a deposition taken in compliance with the law in the 
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party 
against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil 
action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony 
by direct, cross, or re-direct examination. 
Rule 804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence. Here, the depositions of the surgeon in 
the Gottfredson and Haase cases occurred in civil actions then pending against 
the surgeon. The surgeon and his counsel in those cases had a motive identical 
to the motive of the hospital in this case: to defeat liability by demonstrating the 
surgeon was fit and able. The surgeon and his counsel had opportunity to 
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develop his testimony by cross examination during those depositions. There is 
no basis for assuming that had the hospital's counsel been present, he would 
have done anything that the surgeon's own counsel didn't do to "develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or re-direct examination". Rule 804(b)(1), U.R.E. 
Courts which have considered the "predecessor in interest" requirement 
have held it does not require "privity or common property interest" but "rather, a 
shared interest in the material facts and outcome of the case will create such an 
interest." New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. PPG Industries. 197 F.3d 96, at , 
fn. 21 (3rd Cir. 1999); See also Llovd v. American Export Lines. Inc.. 580 F.2d 
1179, 1185-87 (3rd Cir. 1978). In New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson. 
888 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1989), the court found that if a "like motive" to develop the 
same material facts is present, the predecessor in interest requirement is met. 
The burden of establishing a lack of similar motive of witness examination is on 
the party against whom the former testimony is being offered. Supermarket of 
Marlinaton v. Meadow Gold Dairies. 874 F. Supp. 721 (WDVa. 1994). The 
hospital has not met and cannot meet that burden. 
The surgeon's sworn deposition statements were made in a civil action in 
which he was attempting to defeat liability by demonstrating he was a fit and able 
surgeon. His interest as a defendant was identical to the hospital's interest in this 
action. He was capably represented by counsel who had ample opportunity and 
an identical motive to "develop", rebut or clarify his testimony. 
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D. The Surgeon's Statements were admissible under the 
Catch-all Exceptions of Rules 803 and 804 Because They 
Carried Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness. 
Hearsay statements are admissible under Rule 803(24) and 804(5) even 
when they do not qualify under any other recognized exception when they have 
"equivalent substantial guarantees of trustworthiness". The "catch all" exceptions 
set forth in these two rules are identical. They provide for the admission of 
a statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent substantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines 
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable 
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and 
the interests of justice will best be served by admission 
of the statement into evidence. 
Rule 803(24); See also Rule 804(5). Here, the surgeon's sworn deposition 
statements were offered as evidence of material facts. They were more probative 
on the points for which they were offered than any other evidence Mrs. Haase 
could procure through reasonable efforts.4 The general purposes of our rules of 
4
 Mrs. Haase attempted to obtain the surgeon's military discharge records 
but found they could not be obtained without the authorization of the surgeon's 
widow, who refused to authorize their release. The massive pleading file in this 
case reflects Mrs. Haase's dogged but fruitless attempts to obtain, prior to trial, 
records from the V.A. and from other providers of medical and psychological care 
to the surgeon. When she was finally able to obtain, the Day Spring records, the 
hospital refused to stipulate to their authenticity. Her counsel therefore had to 
take no fewer than 3 depositions to establish the truth of information contained in 
those records. Ultimately, the trial court refused to allow admission of any portion 
of the Day Spring records. (Tr. 1196). 
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evidence and the interests of justice were best served by the trial court's 
admission of the surgeon's statements into evidence. Because the statements 
carried substantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the trial court was correct in 
allowing them to be heard by the jury. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
THE RESULTS OF THE SURGEON'S FINGER 
DEXTERITY TESTS. THE FACT THAT THE TESTS 
WERE ADMINISTERED 14 MONTHS AFTER THE 
SURGERY ON MRS. HAASE GOES TO THE WEIGHT, 
NOT THE ADMISSIBILITY, OF THEIR RESULTS. 
Neither the dexterity tests administered to the surgeon during his May, 
1997 deposition nor the test results constitute "hearsay". By stipulation, the 
testing was videotaped. The videotape was available for review by counsel and 
the court at any time. The tests were administered by a Utah Department of 
Work Services employee in Vernal who was subpoenaed to testify at trial and did 
in fact testify at trial. She was cross examined by the hospital's counsel in front of 
the jury concerning the tests she administered and the results of those tests. 
Although the hospital was not present when the court in Vernal granted 
leave to administer the dexterity tests, the position it likely would have taken was 
strenuously and valiantly argued by the surgeon's own able counsel, Mr. David 
Epperson. The hospital's presumed objection to the administration of the 
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dexterity tests could not have been presented more forcefully or vehemently than 
presented by Mr. Epperson. The admissibility of the dexterity tests and test 
results was thoroughly briefed long before the trial occurred. (See, R.175-211 
and 304-336).5 
The fact that the tests were administered 14 months after the surgeon 
operated on Mrs. Haase does not render their results irrelevant or inadmissible. 
That fact goes only to weight, not to admissibility. The hospital's counsel very 
eloquently argued to the jury that they should assign little weight to the tests 
because of the time gap. (See Tr. 1498-99). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Utah Department 
of Work Services employee, Kathleen Williams, to testify at trial concerning her 
administration of the dexterity tests and the results of those tests. 
5
 In October of 2000, Mrs. Haase counsel presented written argument to 
the trial court stating Mrs. Haase's position: The test results are not hearsay 
because (a) the testing was videotaped and could be reliably confirmed by the 
videotape and (b) the tests were administered by a person who could appear in 
court and authenticate the test results. The hearsay rule is to prevent unreliable 
information from being used as evidence. The dexterity testing information was 
reliable. Its reliability was confirmable both by live testimony of the person 
administering the tests and by the videotaping of the testing itself. 
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IV. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE ADMISSION OF DR. 
LONNIE PAULOS' "UNEDITED"VIDEOTAPED TRIAL 
TESTIMONY BECAUSE THE HOSPITAL MADE ONLY 
FOUR OBJECTIONS DURING THE EXAMINATION, 
THE OBJECTIONS WERE EACH NON MATERIAL 
AND OVERRULEABLE, AND THERE WAS NOTHING 
OBJECTIONABLE TO DELETE. THE JURY HEARD 
NOTHING IT SHOULD NOT HAVE HEARD. 
The formal notice of Dr. Paulos' deposition expressly stated the deposition 
would be videotaped for use at trial in lieu of Dr. Paulos' personal appearance. It 
was clear when Dr. Paulos was deposed that Mrs. Haase intended to use his 
deposition at trial in lieu of his personal appearance. The hospital had notice that 
any objections it wished to make to his testimony should be made on the record 
during the deposition. (Tr. 142). 
On page 17 of its brief, the hospital quotes a passage from the trial 
transcript which supposedly reflects the court's reservations about allowing the 
jury to hear Dr. Paulos' unedited videotape. The passage indicates the court 
would have sustained some objections made during the videotape. That 
passage, however, had nothing to do with Dr. Paulos' videotaped testimony. It 
concerned the videotaped testimony of Dr. Richard Jackson! (Tr. 509 -511). 
The hospital has raised no objection to the use of Dr. Jackson's unedited 
videotaped testimony at trial. The quoted passage, therefore, is both 
inappropriate and misleading in a discussion of Dr. Paulos' videotaped testimony. 
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During the entire deposition of Dr. Paulos, the hospital made only four 
objections. Two simply complained that the question posed by counsel misstated 
the deposition testimony of the hospital's CEO, Ron Perry. After the first such 
objection was made, Mrs. Haase's counsel responded that "the transcript says 
whatever it says" and invited the hospital's counsel to correct whatever 
misstatement he felt had been made. The hospital's counsel declined that 
invitation. (Paulos depo at pp. 8-9) 
The second such objection occurred on page 11 of the deposition: 
Q. Now, I'm not going to try and misstate and I 
haven't so far tried to misstate Ron Perry's 
testimony, but I think he testified that during the 
recruiting process of Dr. Hawkes, Dr. Hawkes told 
him that he had had a falling out with his 
colleagues at Cottonwood Hospital, including you 
and Dr. Rosenberg, and he indicated to . . . Ron 
Perry that the reason for that falling out was of 
jealousy over his, Dr. Hawkes, having some 
preeminence in laser surgery. 
A. Objection, misstates testimony.6 
6
 The hospital's counsel is correct that Mr. Perry had not used the word 
"jealousy". However, counsel's characterization is arguably fair. Mr. Perry said 
this concerning what the surgeon reported to him about his falling out with his 
orthopedic colleagues in Salt Lake: 
Thomas Hawkes was in the forefront of laser shoulder surgery . . . and in 
orthopedic services, among surgeons, one upsmanship is good and bad. 
He was receiving recognition for his ability to perform this process called 
laser shoulder surgery, and Lonnie Paulos and Tom Rosenberg did not 
believe that this procedure was a good procedure and so they had a falling 
out. 
(Ron Perry depo at 33). 
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This objection was also not material. Both sides had full opportunity to explore 
with Dr. Paulos whether there had been a falling out and, if so, the reasons for it. 
Dr. Paulos testified he was not even aware of any "falling out". (Lonnie Paulos 
depo at 11). 
Had the foregoing two objections been ruled on before trial, they would 
have resulted in no editing. There was simply nothing to delete. Moreover, the 
objections were to matters which were in no way material and could not have had 
any substantial impact on the jury's deliberations of the real issues in the case. 
A third objection was merely to foundation. It occurred when Dr. Paulos 
was asked when, if at all, he became aware of the surgeon having any sort of 
problems with drug use. This objection, like the others, proved entirely 
immaterial. Dr. Paulos responded that he was not aware of such problems until 
after the surgeon's death. His reservations about the surgeon's being a danger 
to patients was based entirely on his appraisal of the surgeon's skills and 
judgment in performing surgeries, not upon any impairment related to drug use. 
(Paulos depo at 19, lines 16-20). 
The only other objection was made when Dr. Paulos was asked this 
hypothetical question: 
Q. . . . if you had been contacted . . . in early March 
of 1996 by anyone associated with the re-
credentialing of Dr. Hawkes, what kind of 
response would you have given by then [as to 
whether Dr. Hawkes was a danger to patients]? 
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The hospital objected to this question on the grounds of "foundation, form of the 
question, relevance". (Paulos depo at 16, lines 2-3). The objection to "form of 
the question" is patently meritless I lie objection as lu inundation is likewise 
meritless. Clearly, Dr. Paulos had the foundational knowledge to testify how he 
would have responded to such a question in March of 1996 or, if he didn't, he 
could have said so. The only other ground offered by the hospital was 
"relevance". Clearly, what was knowable by the hospital in early March of I'tMi i 
before this surgeon operated on Mrs. Haase was relevant to whether the hospital 
breached its duty to protect Mrs. Haase from a dangerously unfit surgeon. 
'I he hospital1'i own i ledenlialinq expert I tnijh (Greeley testified ilminq the 
trial that the surgeon would have been due for re-credentialing in either 1995 or 
1996. (R. 1170-71). Since Dr. Paulos had performed repair and revision surgeries 
appropriate person for the hospital to have contacted during the re-credentialing 
process. 
Dr Paulos was lalei asked how he would have responded il the hospital 
had made the same inquiry in 1995. Interestingly, the hospital raised no 
objection to that question ~_ Paulos responded that he would have provided a 
"highly negative" response, \raulos dep at Mi, lines 5-6, page 19, line 9), 
In summary, the failure to "edit" the Paulos deposition was immaterial. The 
jury heard nothing that it should not have heard. The hospital raised a total of 
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four objections during the testimony and all of them were inconsequential.7 
7
 The hospital made no objection to the "meat" of Dr. Paulos' 
testimony, which was his authentication of his written response to a letter from 
Mrs. Haase's counsel in January of 2002. The letter to Dr. Paulos began with the 
following question, typed in bold-faced letters: 
If the administrators or medical executive committee 
of Ashley Valley Hospital had asked you in early 
1993 or at any time thereafter whether Dr. Thomas 
Hawkes was a danger to patients by reason of being 
an impaired or compromised provider or due to 
poor judgment or inadequate skill, what would your 
truthful response have been? 
(Exhibit 1 to Lonnie Paulos deposition; see also page 6 of Paulos deposition). 
Dr. Paulos responded in writing to that letter as follows: 
I have received your letter concerning Dr. Thomas 
Hawkes dated 1/24/02. My response to the question 
that you posed is that patients would have been in 
danger... 
(Exhibit 2 to Lonnie Paulos deposition; see also pp. 6-7 of Paulos deposition). 
Another critical feature of Dr. Paulos' deposition testimony to which the 
hospital raised no objection was his recollection of having in 1993 verbally 
informed the hospital's administrator, Ron Perry, of his serious reservations about 
Dr. Hawkes. When shown a copy of a questionnaire form allegedly sent to him 
by a secretary of the hospital's credentialing committee, Dr. Paulos indicated he 
may in fact have received the questionnaire. The hospital had no record of any 
written response from him and he did not recall having made one. He did, 
however, recall having contacted Ron Perry by telephone to express his negative 
appraisal of the surgeon. (Lonnie Paulos depo at 14 -18). 
Although Mr. Perry denied receiving such a call (Tr. 1165), he did admit 
learning in 1993 that Dr. Paulos held negative views about Dr. Hawkes' operating 
skills and his safety to patients. (Tr. 1165, line 24 -1166, line 2). 
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V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING DR. 
MARGARET ENSIGN TO EXPRESS HER OPINION 
THAT THE SURGEON WAS IMPAIRED AT THE TIME 
OF THE HAASE SURGERY BECAUSE HER OPINION 
WAS SOLIDLY FOUNDED ON SE 'ERAL RELEVANT 
FACTORS WHICH SHE WAS COMPETENT TO 
CONSIDER. 
The hospital suggests that Dr. Ensign's "sole basis" for believing the 
surgeon was impaired "was her conclusion that the post-operative note written by 
the surgeon stnuiuMt COIIIUMU1) MM*I in- "HMstonl" (RiM "I AppHleeA .ess 
Appellant at p. 20). That is not correct.8 
Dr. Ensign's opinion that the surgeon was impaired was based on several 
factor;., other linn the suiyeons operative report being "anatomically inaccurate, 
8
 Dr. Ensign testified that she had reviewed both the pre-surgery and post 
surgery x-rays of Mrs. Haase's right knee, as well as x-rays of Mrs. Haase's 
uninjured left knee, for comparison purposes. She also studied, in addition to the 
surgeon's official report of his surgery on the right knee, the hospital chart and 
records reflecting Mrs. Haase's hospitalization before and after that surgery. In 
addition, she read the office notes, history and physical and operative report of 
Dr. Richard Jackson, the surgeon who undertook to repair the severe patellar 
baja created during the Vernal surgeon's operation. She studied Dr. Jackson's 
deposition testimony and the drawing Dr. Jackson made of what he found in the 
knee when he opened it up, which she compared with the drawing Dr. Hawkes 
had made to reflect what he claimed to have found during his surgery. (R. 
1240). Her opinion was based on the pertinent x-rays, operative reports, 
deposition transcripts, the "nature,... angle,. . . location and . . . severity of the 
patellar tendon laceration . . . Dr. Jackson observed in his repair surgery" and on 
her scrutiny of the operative report the Vernal surgeon dictated on the day he 
performed his surgery. (R. 1246-47). 
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. . . unclear, confusing, [and] incomprehensible". (R. 1250). Those factors 
include the fact that what the surgeon described as his surgery "was totally 
different from what Dr. Jackson found at his surgery" (R. 1251, lines 19-21; 1250, 
lines 3-5). They also included Dr. Ensign's belief, as a trained physician, that an 
unimpaired physician would not prescribe vigorous physical therapy immediately 
post-op for a patient with patellar baja as bad as this patient had (R. 1253-54), 
would not prescribe a duragesic patch - which is a slow releasing narcotic 
medication - for treatment of acute pain in a patient following surgery (R. 1254), 
and would not fail to inform the patient that she had been left with severe patellar 
baja after the surgery. (R. 1254). 
The hospital's suggestion that Dr. Ensign was unqualified to render the 
opinion she rendered is also without merit. Dr. Ensign testified that in addition to 
being a board certified radiologist with a sub specialty in musculoskeletal 
radiology, she took several courses during her medical training dealing with the 
effects of prescription pain medications, Class I, II and III narcotics, Demerol, 
Morphine, etc. She testified she had occasion to prescribe Demerol and other 
prescription pain medications during her career as a physician. She also testified 
that prior to becoming a physician, she worked as a high school teacher and 
athletic coach. She trained and worked with athletes who sustained broken 
bones in their lower extremities. (R. 1241-1242). An objective review of Dr. 
Ensign's entire testimony at trial reveals she was well qualified to render the 
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opinion she rendered The trial courl did not err in so finding 
The trial court's decision to allow Dr. Ensign to testify by telephone was not 
an abuse of discretion. The court heard evidence as to why it was virtually 
equities, concluded that she could testify by telephone. It is likely her testifying by 
telephone was more prejudicial to Mrs. Haase than to the hospital. 
1 here is no IMSIS toi < om hiding Ihril had I >i Ensign n< i allowed to 
testify, the outcome of the trial would have been any different. The evidence that 
the surgeon was in an unfit, dangerous condition at the time he operated on Mrs. 
Haase was overwhelming. Ensign was only one of some 20 witnesses to 
offer opinions and observations as to the surgeon's apparent impairment. More 
specifically, at least two other witnesses, orthopedic surgeon William Stryker and 
Richard Jackson, testified as she did that the surgeon's operative report was 
grossly "nonsensical". (Tr. 1263-1283 and 474-554). Their testimony rendered 
her opinion as to the operative report merely cumulative. 
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VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING 
REFERENCE TO THE SURGEON'S TREATMENT AT 
DAY SPRING BECAUSE HIS TREATMENT THERE 
WAS HIGHLY RELEVANT TO WHETHER THE 
HOSPITAL WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO 
PROTECT MRS. HAASE FROM A DANGEROUSLY 
IMPAIRED SURGEON. 
The hospital has not identified any particular passage from the trial record 
containing a reversibly erroneous reference to the surgeon's treatment at Day 
Spring. Such failure should itself defeat the hospital's claim. 
In his pretrial deposition, the hospital's CEO testified he had not been 
aware the surgeon had been treated at Day Spring.9 In his trial testimony, he 
initially claimed to have first learned of the surgeon's in-patient treatment at Day 
Spring during his deposition in this case. (Tr. 196). However, he eventually 
admitted he had learned of the surgeon's Day Spring stay before the surgeon 
operated on Mrs. Haase 6 months later and that this was contrary to his 
deposition testimony. (See Tr. 197). Reference to the Day Spring treatment was 
necessary to impeach the hospital's CEO. Reference to the surgeon's treatment 
at Day Spring was appropriate. In fact, admission of the Day Spring treatment 
records themselves would have been appropriate. See Section II, Argument I, 
infra. 
9The records themselves suggest in no fewer than 5 places that the 




THE TRIAL COURT MADE REVERSIBLY 
ERRONEOUS RULINGS IN FAVOR OF THE HOSPITAL. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER AUTHENTICATED 
RECORDS OF THE DECEASED SURGEON'S 
TREATMENT AT DAY SPRING WHEN THOSE 
RECORDS WERE OFFERED A) TO SHOW WHAT 
THE HOSPITAL COULD AND SHOULD HAVE 
KNOWN; AND B) TO REBUT THE HOSPITAL'S 
CLAIM IT HAD NEITHER REQUESTED NOR 
REQUIRED HIM TO SUBMIT TO TREATMENT AT 
DAY SPRING. 
Rulings on the admissibility ul evidence are generally reviewable undei an 
abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606, 613 (Utah App. 
1997), affd, 983 P.d 975 (Utah 1998). Mrs. Haase submits the trial court acted 
beyviiul llu) hounds ol leasonabilily in iHiisinu, admission ol tho surgeon's Day 
Spring treatment records. 
The trial court's refusal to admit selected portions of the surgeon's 
treatment records in the Day Spring program was based on lack of evidence that 
the hospital knew what those records contained before the surgeon operated on 
Mrs. Haase. (Tr. 1196). The key question, however, isn't solely what the 
Day Spring. The records themselves indicate in numerous places that the 
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surgeon had been sent to Day Spring by hospital representatives.10 It is strongly 
inferable from the Day Spring records that the hospital should have learned both 
of the specifics and of the outcome of the surgeon's in-patient treatment there. 
Having sent him, the hospital had an obligation to find out if the treatment was 
successful and, if the care providers at Day Spring recommended further 
treatment, whether he was submitting to the following up care he needed. Jurors 
could well have found the records highly useful in determining whether the 
hospital met its duty to monitor and follow up on the treatment it recommended. 
The hospital could have discovered the contents of the Day Spring records 
10
 Day Spring chart entries include these: 
"The medical staff at his hospital have requested an evaluation concerning 
his possible drinking and substance abuse." 
"The hospital medical staff has requested this evaluation." 
"Here now per referral from 1° [primary care ] M.D." 
"Admits that hospital he works at requested a CD [chemical dependency] 
evaluation." 
"13. Have you ever gotten into trouble at work because of your drinking or 
drug use? / [Yes]." 
(See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 18 and Addendum 2, attached, at pp. 6,10, 24,46, 
107). 
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under the authorization the surgeon signed in his ( ledenlialing application 11 
11
 Although the hospital was unable to provide or authenticate a complete 
copy of its entire credentialing file on the surgeon, it did produce, through various 
witnesses, portions of the credentialing file. One document produced as part of 
the surgeon's credentialing file is entitled "Specific Consent to Information 
Exchange and Conditions of Consideration in Connection with . . . 
Appointment/Re-appointment." (Emphasis added) This document, apparently 
signed by the surgeon on 8-15-94, provides in pertinent part: 
I understand that it is necessary . . . to obtain detailed 
information about me in order to complete the Process. 
I understand that such information may be private, 
sensitive, privileged, and otherwise confidential. It is my 
request, and I hereby give my consent, that such 
information be disclosed. 
. . . I intend that this consent include all information 
that reflects on my ability to safely, competently, 
and professionally perform the professional 
activities . . . and/or... participation I have requested . 
I intend that this consent extend to all persons, 
institutions, and entities that have such information 
about me, including:... hospitals,... and to persons or 
committees associated with any of these. In connection 
with the Process, I also give my consent for all such 
persons, institutions, and entities to express their 
opinion(s) about me and to make recommendations 
about my professional skills, conduct, and ability to 
perform the clinical privileges . . . I have applied for. I 
also give my consent for [Ashley Valley Medical Center] 
and [its] medical staffs, officers, agents, committees, 
and employees involved in the Process to receive and 
act upon all such information, opinions, and 
recommendations in connection with the Process. 
(See Addendum !l attached) 
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One of Mrs. Haase's principal reasons for offering the Day Spring chart 
was to rebut the hospital's assertion that it was unaware the surgeon had 
received in-patient treatment at Day Spring. Dr. Ace Madsen was both the 
surgeon's primary care physician and a member of the hospital's medical staff. 
At the time the surgeon was credentialed, he was a member of the Credentialing 
Committee, the Medical Executive Committee and the hospital's Governing 
Board. (Tr. 227, 660, 973-74,1104-05). Dr. Madsen claimed at trial to have 
been unaware that the surgeon had sought and obtained treatment at Day Spring 
and he denied having referred the surgeon to the Day Spring program. (Tr. 1072). 
The Day Spring records rebut that testimony. (See fn. 10, supra). Mrs. Haase 
should have been allowed to confront him with the Day Spring entries indicating 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW THE JURY TO HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF 
DR. RAYMOND MIDDLETON, WHO TREATED THE 
SURGEON AT DAY SPRING AND COULD 
AUTHENTICATE THE SURGEON'S PERTINENT DAY 
SPRING TREATMENT RECORDS. 
In his February 1, 2002 deposition, Dr. Middleton authenticated the written 
memorialization of the history and physical he took of the surgeon in September 
of iswfi rip acknowledged having learned the medical staff at the hospital had 
requested an evaluation concerning the surgeon's drinking and substance abuse. 
(Middleton depo at 6). He also acknowledged he had learned the surgeon 
suffered from frequent chronic migraine headaches. He determined the 
surgeon's "recent memory was impaired" and "his judgment has probably been 
poor". (Middleton depo at 9,10). His treatment plan for the surgeon included 
attendance at AA [Alcoholics Anonymous] and NA [Narcotics Anonymous] 
meetings and he expected the surgeon In attend such meetings aflei his in 
patient stay at Day Spring. (Middleton depo at 12). Dr. Middleton confirmed 
there were indication throughout the record that people at the hospital had 
referred the sinneon to Hav Sprint) I}' .Hoton depo at I'M He also conlirineil 
the surgeon had acknowledged needing a career change and indicating he 
needed "at least 8 more months working as an orthopedic surgeon to avoid an 
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extreme catastrophe with the IRS, family and other issues".12 (Middleton depo at 
21). 
Dr. Middleton confirmed the surgeon had admitted having a chemical 
dependency problem as a result of long term use of opiates. (Middleton depo at 
23). Dr. Middleton prescribed ongoing psychiatric treatment with Dr. Collins, 
following the surgeon's discharge. (Middleton depo at 27-29). 
Dr. Middleton's deposition testimony shed considerable light on the 
surgeon's condition 6 months prior to his undertaking surgery on Mrs. Haase and 
was therefore relevant. The jury reasonably could have found information he 
possessed concerning the surgeon's condition included information the hospital 
should have obtained, if it did not. In addition, his testimony rebutted the 
hospital's assertion it had not requested or demanded the surgeon go to Day 
Spring. (See p. 27, supra, and fn. 10, supra). 
The jury should have been allowed to hear Dr. Middleton's testimony. 
12The surgeon operated on Mrs. Haase within that 8 month period following 
his acknowledgment that he needed a career change. 
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THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO 
CONSIDER AN ASSESSMENT OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES AGAINST THE HOSPITAL. 
Mrs. Haase's complaint specifically requests punitive damages. (R. 6, 4). 
Mrs. Haase's Proposed Special Verdict Form included a question and a space for 
punitive damages. (R. 857-859). Mrs. Haase's Proposed Jury Instructions 
included an instruction on punitive damages. (Exhibit 13 to appellant's opening 
brief). The trial conil howevci, ilei lined to allmi llio \\i\\ In i.:onsuiei punitive 
damages. In doing so, it erred. 
The trial court's refusal to allow the jury to consider punitive damages was 
tantamount to M directed vi idicl uh Mis lipase s punitive d,nii,-jqe claim In 
reviewing such a decision, the evidence must be examined in a light most 
favorable to the adverse party and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence 
or the inferences to he drawn thereliom which would support a finding in favor of 
the adverse party, the directed verdict can not be sustained. Management 
Comm. of Gravstone Pine Home Owners Association Ex Rel Owners of 
Condominiums v. Gravstone Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). A directed 
verdict is only appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a matter of law, 
that reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be determined from the 
evidence presented. I is issue, then, presents a question of law to be 
reviewed for correctness only. 
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By statute, punitive damages may be considered and awarded when there 
is clear and convincing evidence that a party's acts or omissions manifest a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
UCA §78-18-1 (1)(a). During the nine day trial, clear and convincing evidence 
was presented in rich abundance that the hospital was fully aware that Dr. 
Hawkes was a dangerously impaired surgeon who suffered from a host of 
physical, emotional and financial problems, regularly consumed a dangerously 
high volume of narcotic pain medication and was so impaired that the hospital's 
CEO arranged for hospitalization and referred him to the Division of Professional 
Licensing's Impaired Physician Program one year before he operated on Mrs. 
Haase. The hospital began administering drug screen tests on Dr. Hawkes as 
early as 1993 and continued such testing past the surgeon's operation on Mrs. 
Haase but failed to retain (or at least produce) the results of those tests. 
Dr. Hawkes' surgeries brought to the hospital a revenue of one million 
dollars per year. (Tr. 253). There is strong evidence that the hospital placed 
profits before patients and put its own financial welfare ahead of the welfare of 
both Dr. Hawkes and his patients.13 
13
 In closing argument, the jurors were asked: "Which is better: An 
impaired surgeon or no surgeon?." The evidence clearly and convincingly 
showed the answer in this instance to be: "It depends on whether you are the 
patient or the hospital". Perversely, the more impaired the surgeon, the more 
revenue that flowed to the hospital. In the case of Mrs. Haase, her error-filled 
surgery required her to remain in the hospital several days. If the surgeon's 
judgment and skills had not been impaired, Mrs. Haase either would not have had 
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Several witnesses confirmed the existence of numerous red flag indicators 
of a dangerously impaired surgeon. The trial court allowed 15 of those "red flags" 
to be admitted into evidence. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 9; See Addendum 1, attached). 
The hospital .allowed I'Ji I lawkes ID pertonn surgeries at the hospital 
before he had even submitted his application for privileges! (Tr. 1410) The 
hospital's own credentialing expert, Hugh Greeley, admitted that it would be 
reckless for a Hospital to permit a physician to perform surgery before it had 
verified that the physician was competent to perform sundry ( T i 1436 $7 c>e 
also 1411). 
Allhough Mi. Greeley claimed he lacked expertise to opine on whether it 
would also be reckless for a hospital . ^gularly used 
opiates to operate on patients (Tr. 1437), other witnesses testified that a surgeon 
on opiate pain medications was extremely dangerous and the combination of 
such medication wilh prrsoiiption slumping ineilicalion (winch the surgeon was 
consuming) was "dynamite". (Tr. 1282). 
There was ample evidence to support a jury award of punitive damages. 
[he trial nunt erioci as a matter ol law in letiising ID allow the jury to consider a 
punitive damage assessment. 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
A STATUTORY PEER-REVIEW PRIVILEGE 
PRECLUDED MRS. HAASE'S INTRODUCTION OF 
EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY AGAINST THE 
HOSPITAL WHEN A) THE INFORMATION 
CONCERNED THE SURGEON'S FITNESS, NOT HIS 
PERFORMANCE, AND B) THE"PEER" UNDER 
REVIEW WAS DECEASED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
Utah's medical peer-review statute protects certain information from 
disclosure on the theory and policy ground that health care providers will be 
better able to improve medical care if their peer-review studies and discussions 
are kept secret. UCA §26-25-3. The peer-review privilege, however, is to be 
narrowly construed. Benson ex rel v. IHC Hosps. 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993). Our 
Supreme Court has held that the privilege protects only documents prepared 
specifically for peer-review purposes, not documents that might or could be used 
in the peer-review process. Id. See also McCall v. Henry Medical Center. Inc.. 
551 S.E.2d 739, 739, 742-43 (Ga. App. 2001) and Greenwood v. Wierdsma.. 741 
P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987). 
A critical distinction exists between peer-review and credentialing. Peer-
review measures a provider's performance. Credentialing inquires about a 
provider's fitness. Even the hospital's credentialing expert admitted the 
distinction between credentialing and peer-review. (Tr. 1365). He further 
admitted that the credentialing and reappointing process includes assessments 
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"as to whether en urn .1 physicians health statu1", would compromise then ability lo 
provide safe patient care." (Tr. 1366). He acknowledged that hospitals are 
expected to make such assessments as part of the credentialing/reappointment 
process (Tr 1366). 
Throughout the trial, the hospital was allowed to hide behind the cloak of 
peer-review secrecy in dodging pertinent questions and withholding critical 
information as to what il knew concerning Ihe surgeon's physical impairments, 
drug dependencies and emotional and financial difficulties.14 Its CEO and 
14
 Mr. Perry gave two-word, "peer-review" stonewalling responses to 
questions including these: 
"As chief executive officer of the hospital did you personally become 
aware that Dr. Hawkes between '93 and March 12 of '96 had sought 
treatment from Ace Madsen?" (Tr. 1172). 
"Did you ever contact Dr. Hawkes' physician, Dr. Ace Madsen or 
anybody else, to determine whether he may have had a drug 
problem during the critical time period we're talking about [1993 
through April 15, 1996]?" (Tr. 261). 
"Can you tell us whether you passed on to the board the fruits of 
your investigation of the high school falling off the horse incident?" 
(Tr. 267). 
Did you ever report to the governing board about Dr. Hawkes having 
gone to rehabilitation for physical, emotional or drug problems? (Tr. 
237) 
"Did you report to the credentialing committee what Dr. Hawkes had 
told you about his falling out with his orthopedic colleagues in Salt 
Lake?" (Tr. 1175) 
"Did you ever tell anyone on the credentialing committee or the MEC 
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attorney claimed the peer-review privilege on no fewer than 21 occasions during 
the trial. (Tr. 171, 189, 196,204,206,207,237,265,267,273, 1164, 1172, 
1173, 1175). The trial court routinely sustained the peer-review privilege 
assertions. (See, e.g., Tr. 207, 235, 261, 262, 266, 267, 275). 
The peer-review privilege is to protect the care provider whose 
performance is under review by his peers. In this instance, the care provider 
died several years before the case came to trial. A major purpose of the peer-
review privilege evaporates when the person under review is no longer living. 
If this case is to be retried, the trial court should be given clear direction 
that no information concerning the surgeon's qualifications and fitness to perform 
invasive surgeries on patients at the hospital are to be protected on the ground of 
peer-review privilege. Queries pertaining to a surgeon's fitness fall under 
credentialing/reappointment matters, unlike queries concerning a surgeon's 
infection and morbidity rates, which may well be peer-review matters. 
about your awareness that Dr. Hawkes had some serious emotional 
problems?" (Tr. 1173). 
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SECTION THREE 
THE JURY'S CLEAR INTENT THAT MRS. HAASE 
RECEIVE ITS FULL $820,000 DAMAGE AWARD 
SHOULD BE HONORED. 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 
BISHOP V. GEN TEC. INC. 
Whether a trial court properly interpreted the effect of a prior judicial 
decision is a question of law which is to be reviewed for correctness with no 
deference given to the trial court's determination. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. 
Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996). 
There no longer can be any question that the controlling law in Utah now 
dictates that the jury's intent, above all else, is to be honored. Whenever 
necessary, a "jury's verdict should be amended to reflect the true intent of 
the jury." Bishop v. Gen Tec. Inc.. 48 P.3d at 227 (Utah 2002). 
The hospital asks this court to disregard the actual holding and precise 
ruling of our Supreme Court in Bishop and instead focus on New York case law. 
(Hospital's brief, p. 28). The hospital also asks this court to distinguish clerical 
error from judicial error in a manner inconsistent with the express distinction 
made by our Supreme Court. Unequivocally and unreservedly our Supreme 
Court has stated that "accurately recording the intent of the jury in its calculations 
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of the damage award constitutes a correction of a clerical error, not a judicial 
error". Bishop at 227. Here, 6 of the 7 jurors who returned to court 6 weeks 
after the trial at the trial court's direction declared, after learning the court had 
interpreted their special verdict in a way which gave Mrs. Haase only $246,000 of 
their damage award, that they had not accurately recorded their actual intent 
on the special verdict form. (Tr. 1358 at pp. 24-25). Those same 6 jurors 
responded "No" to the specific query: "was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase 
only $246,000 for the damages she sustained as a result of the hospital's 
negligence?" (R. 1358, p. 19, lines 1-18, 22-25). 
II. 
JUROR MISUNDERSTANDING WAS LIMITED 
SOLELY TO MATTERS FLOWING FROM THE 
INTRODUCTION OF FAULT ASSESSMENT AGAINST 
THE SURGEON (AFTER THE JURY HAD BEEN TOLD 
REPEATEDLY THE CASE WAS NOT ABOUT THE 
SURGEON'S NEGLIGENCE). 
The hospital mistakes Mrs. Haase's purpose in explaining the likely cause 
of juror misunderstanding over its assessment of fault against the surgeon and 
the effect of that assessment on its damage award. Mrs. Haase does not seek to 
assign error with respect to the adequacy or inadequacy of jury instructions and 
special verdict forms. Her purpose has been merely to explain why the trial court 
and the jury did not share the same understanding of the jury's damage award. 
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The trial was not about the surgeon's negligence. (Tr. 2) The hospital 
asked the court to remove the surgeon's negligence from consideration at trial. 
The court granted the hospital's request. (Tr. 1198, lines 16-17, 21,1200,1212-
13). 
Our Supreme Court recently declared: 
A comparative negligence analysis necessarily involves 
an assessment of the relative degree of negligence of 
both parties. Indeed, in order to compare negligence, 
the trier of fact must assess both parties' conduct. 
Harding v. Bell. 460 UAR 3, 5, fn. 4, 202 UT 108 (Utah 2002). Here, the jury had 
no basis for comparing the negligence of the hospital with the surgeon because 
the surgeon's negligence was not before it.15 It is clearly understandable that the 
jury intended for Mrs. Haase to receive its full $820,000 damage award, as that 
damage award reflected the damages flowing from the only negligence it had 
been given opportunity to consider. 
It may be significant that although the jury had no knowledge of the amount 
of money the surgeon's representatives had paid Mrs. Haase in settlement three 
years prior to this trial, that sum, when added to the jury's $820,000 award 
produces a total recovery just $3,100 off the economist's projection of Mrs. 
15
 It was the hospital who asked the court to remove the surgeon's 
negligence from the jury's consideration. The court granted that request without 
regard to Mrs. Haase's position. Mrs. Haase should not be punished by having to 
endure another trial when she did nothing to contribute to the misunderstanding. 
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Haase's actual special damages. It is apparent, therefore, that the jury was 
conservatively wise beyond its knowledge in awarding Mrs. Haase $820,000 for 
the hospital's negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
Under controlling Utah case law, the jury's true intent governs as to the 
damages Mrs. Haase is to receive for the hospital's negligence. The jury's intent 
to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 for the hospital's negligence is overwhelmingly 
clear from the jurors' post-trial declarations. 
The trial court committed no reversible errors in favor of Mrs. Haase during 
the trial. All of the evidence the jury was allowed to hear against the hospital was 
both relevant and reliable. Much of the evidence the hospital claims should not 
have been admitted was largely cumulative and did not likely impact the result. 
The trial court did make reversibly erroneous rulings in favor of the hospital 
during the trial in: refusing to allow the jury to consider authenticated records of 
the deceased surgeon's Day Spring treatment records; refusing to allow the jury 
to hear the testimony of Dr. Raymond Middleton, who treated the surgeon at Day 
Spring; concluding Utah's statutory peer-review privilege justified the hospital's 
dodging numerous pertinent questions about its awareness of the surgeon's 
16
 See fn 5 on p. 8 of Mrs. Haase's brief in chief. Counsel reveals this fact 
as an officer of this Court in full awareness of both the penalty of perjury and the 
risk of violating a confidentiality term. 
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unfitness; and refusing to allow the jury to consider an assessment of punitive 
damages against the hospital. 
Although errors which favored the hospital may well justify a new trial, Mrs. 
Haase does not seek a new trial. On the contrary, she submits requiring the out-
of-town judge, attorneys, expert witnesses and fact witnesses to return to Vernal 
for a two week trial would entail colossal expense, inconvenience and trauma. 
By this point, just impaneling a Uintah County jury without knowledge or bias 
concerning this case would be tremendously time-consuming and expensive, if 
not impossible. 
Neither Mrs. Haase nor the jury did anything wrong. Mrs. Haase should 
not be punished with having to endure a new trial. Ordering a new trial would 
punish Mrs. Haase for mistakes she did not make and for a misunderstanding 
she did not create. By the clear weight of evidence, the jurors' post-trial 




Mrs. Haase requests the relief she be granted include: 
1. An order substituting the jury verdict component of the judgment from 
$246,000 to $820,000; 
2. An order awarding her all costs incurred by her in this appeal, in addition to 
the $4,570.19 in taxable costs awarded by the trial court; 
3. Interest on the total judgment amount at the pre-judgment legal interest 
rate of 10% per annum or at the judgment interest rate, whichever the court 
deems more appropriate, pursuant to UCA §78-24-44 and 15-1-1. 
-42-
ADDENDUM TO REPLY BRIEF 
MRS. HAASE'S RESPONSE TO THE HOSPITAL'S 
OPPOSITION TO MRS. HAASE'S OVERLENGTH 
BRIEF AND THE ALLEGED RAISING OF "NEW" 
ISSUES. 
The hospital cannot seriously contend surprise by Mrs. Haase's evidence 
issues (Section Two, supra). On pages 2 and 3 of her initial brief, Mrs. Haase 
identified nine issues she wished to preserve. Each of the four issues raised in 
Section II of this brief are identified as trial court errors on those pages of her 
opening brief. Because the hospital is allowed to file the last brief, it will not be 
prejudiced by responding to those issues in that brief. 
After stating her opposition to remand for retrial and identifying the specific 
unfavorable evidentiary rulings she contests, Mrs. Haase stated her intent to 
defer briefing of her evidence issues to the submission she would file in response 
to the hospital's cross-appeal (see appellant's opening brief, p.3). The hospital's 
cross-appeal, unlike Mrs. Haase's opening brief, deals with trial evidence issues. 
Mrs. Haase's opening brief was less than 37 pages in length - nearly 14 pages 
shorter than it could have been. The combined length of Mrs. Haase's two briefs 
(excluding this addendum) exceeds the total page limits normally allowed under 
Rule 24(g), URAP by only 4 pages. 
The hospital's opening brief was nearly 7 pages shorter than allowed. Mrs. 
Haase has no objection to this Court's receiving from the hospital a final brief of 
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up to 37 pages in length. If it does so, each party will have had equal opportunity 
and space to brief the issues properly before this Court. 
The hospital should have adequate time and space to respond to the 
issues identified but not briefed in Mrs. Haase's opening brief. Mrs. Haase will 
not oppose a motion from the hospital for leave to file a final brief longer than 25 
pages. Under the circumstances, such a motion should be granted. Each side 
should have equal opportunity adequately to address the issues raised by the 
other. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 2003. 
teiSSS^i 
Dougfas G. Mortensen 
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 9 (RED FLAG INDICATORS OF AN 
IMPAIRED SURGEON) 
SELECTED PAGES OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT 18 
(THE SURGEON'S DAY SPRING TREATMENT RECORDS) 
CONSENT TO RELEASE OF INFORMATION FOUND IN THE 








I . EXHIBFT 
DR. HAWKES' 
APPLICATION PAPERS 
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ABOUT HIS MOST RECENT 
WORK AS A SURGEON 
DR. HAWKES' WIFE 
REQUESTED 
DISABILITY 
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OTHER DRS. REPORTED 
THAT THEIR 
PATIENTS WOULD 
NOT BE TREATED BY 
DR. HAWKES 
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VIEWS OF HIS 
ABILITIES AS A 
SURGEON 
DR. HAWKES HAD 
TROUBLES WITH HIS 
ORTHOPEDIC 
COLLEAGUES 




IN 1995 FOR 




DR. HAWKES TRIED TO 
GAIN ADMISSION TO A 
HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL 
GAME ON HORSEBACK 
WHILE INEBRIATED 






IN SEPT. 1995 
DR. HAWKES AND AVMC 
WERE SUED FOR 
MALPRACTICE IN 1995 
AND BOTH PAID MONEY 
TO THE PATIENT 
Tab 2 
Selected Portions of Day Spring Treatment Records 
Offered into Evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 18 
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NAME: HAWKES, THOMAS 
ADMITTED: 09-07-95 
RAY MIDDLETON, MD 
HISTORY & PHYSICAL 
MEDICAL HISTORY 
PRESENTING COMPLAINT: Tm very depressed and I need to control my pain." 
PATIENT PROFILE: Thomas is a 50-year-old orthopedic surgeon who was born in Brigham City, and has been 
living in Vernal for the last two and a half years. He is LDS by religious profession, and claims that he 
is very active in his faith. He is admitted to hospital for evaluation concerning the possible abuse of pain . 
medications, particularly benzodiazepines and various narcotic preparations. He was a helicopter pilot 
in Vietnam, and was shot down and severely injured. The crash apparently killed all the other occupants 
of the helicopter. He continues to have ongoing problems, having fractured his left ankle, ruptured his 
liver, chest injuries, severe cervical spine injuries, and has developed arthritis as a result of all these 
problems. He has been under the influence of benzodiazepines on a couple of occasions when it was felt 
by the people in his town that he might have been drinking. In fact, he denies this. The medical staff 
at his hospital have requested an evaluation concerning his possible drinking and substance abuse. 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL EFFECTS: Following his rehabilitation from the injuries in Vietnam, he went into 
medical school and on into orthopedics. He has practiced in several areas and on a couple of occasions 
has been accused of being a drug addict, and either quit or was removed from medical staff. He 
apparently is a very hardworking and very adequate surgeon. He has been married for 28 years. He has 
ten children. His wife is very concerned about the allegations of substance abuse and possible alcoholism 
in her husband. He has never had any legal problems around the substance abuse, but is in some serious 
problems with the IRS and with finances in general. He currently is living in his own home. There have 
been several problems with his health, as noted above. He performs well sexually. He has severe 
problems with sleep. His appetite has been poor. His main hobby currently is raising and breaking 
horses. With regard to chronic illnesses, he does have chronic arthritis, chronic pain from the injuries 
noted above. 
PAST HEALTH: He has been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder, which apparently still bothers him. He 
has a long family history and personal history of depression. He has been on various antidepressants. 
He has had the usual childhood diseases. He had a very traumatic childhood, being raised by an 
alcoholic father and a mother who was not always available to him, either. 
SURGERIES: He has had multiple surgeries as a result of his injuries. 
ALLERGIES: He complains of season allergies. He may be allergic to morphine and to some of the dyes that 
are used in radiological investigations. 
FAMILY HISTORY: Father died at 80 of alcoholism. Mother died at 52 of a lymphoma. He has two half 
sisters, one of whom is a recovering alcoholic and substance abuser. The other, he is not sure of her 
state of health. He has one full sister who lives out of state. She is a substance abuser and a lesbian. 
He states there is a good deal of alcoholism on the paternal side of the family, in that all of his paternal 
uncles and several of his paternal cousins are dead from alcoholism. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS 
1. SKIN: No rash, itching, moles, sores, hives, cancer, hair, pigmentation. 
2. EYES: He wears corrective lenses. No pain, diplopia, scotoma, itch, dryness, infection or redness. 
3. EARS: No hearing loss, infection, pain, tinnitus, vertigo. 
4. NOSE: No dryness. No bleeding, pain, discharge. No obstruction. Smell normal. No sneezing. 
5. MOUTH: No soreness, pain, infection, ulcers, hoarseness, dryness. Gums are clean and healthy, as are 
tongue and teeth. Swallowing normal. 
6. BREASTS: No discharge, lump, pain, bleeding or infection. 
f/fj^ WASATCH CANYONS HOSPITAL 
I H C A Service of Intermountain Health Care 
3770 South 1500 West, Tavlonville, Utah 84123 
DISCHARGE SUMMARY 
PATIENT NAME: HAWKES, THOMAS 
MEDICAL RECORD NO: 00-46-50 
UNIT PROGRAM: Dayspring Inpatient 
DATE OF ADMISSION: 09/07/95 
DATE OF DISCHARGE: 09/12/95 
ATTENDING PHYSICIAN: Ray Middleton, M.D. 
ADMISSION DIAGNOSES 
Axis I Major Depression, Recurrent, Moderate 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Opiate-Derivative Analgesic Abuse/Dependence 
Axis II Depressive Personality Disorder with Compulsive and Histrionic Features 
Axis HI Status post multiple injuries with resultant surgeries 
DISCHARGE DIAGNOSES 
Axis I Major Depression, Recurrent, Moderate 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Opiate-Derivative Analgesic Abuse/Dependence 
Axis II Depressive Personality Disorder with Compulsive and Histrionic Features 
Axis HI Status post multiple injuries with resultant surgeries 
CONDITION ON DISCHARGE 
Improved physically and mentally over admission status. 
HISTORY 
Tom is a 50-year-old orthopedic surgeon who has been living in Vernal for the last 2 1/2 years, where 
he practices orthopedics. He has been admitted for evaluation concerning the possible abuse of pain and 
benzodiazepine-type medications. He was seriously injured when a helicopter he was piloting was shot 
down in Vietnam, and he continues to have ongoing problems with arthritis, his abdomen, and his cervical 
spine particularly. The hospital medical staff has requested this evaluation. 
He has been married for 28 years and has 10 children. His wife is very concerned about the allegations 
of substance abuse and possible abuse of alcohol and drugs by her husband. He complains of serious 
financial problems. He has difficulty with sleep, and his appetite has been poor. 
He has been diagnosed in the past with attention-deficit disorder, and stated that he is deeply depressed 
at this time. His family history is positive for alcoholism, in that he had an alcoholic father. One of his 
half-sisters is a recovering alcoholic and substance abuser, as is another sister who lives out of state. He 
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I DISCHARGE SUMMARY 
stated that there is a good deal of alcoholism on the paternal side of the family, in that all of his paternal 
uncles and several of his paternal cousins have died from alcoholism. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
Essentially within normal limits. He did have some difficulty with full range of movement in his head 
and neck because of his previous injuries. There is scarring around his ankle fracture and surgery, as well 
as abdominal scarring from the surgery on his ruptured liver sustained in the helicopter crash. 
LABORATORY DATA 
Urine toxicology was positive for benzodiazepines and caffeine., SMAC profile showed elevations of 
cholesterol and LDH, as well as triglycerides and VLDL cholesterol. RPR was nonreactive. Routine 
urinalysis was normal. 
HOSPITAL COURSE (Medical) 
Medical problems encountered during the course of the patient's hospital stay included: 
1. He did not appear to be under the influence, and required little in the way of detox medications. 
2. Various aches and pains from arthritis and old injuries, for which he has taken enteric-coated 
Naprosyn in the past. When taking this kind of medication, he also needs to take Zantac and 
Carafate. 
3. Seasonal allergies, which normally respond to Claritin, and appeared to do so at this time. 
4. Depression. He was seen in consultation by a psychologist and a psychiatrist, and trazodone and 
Zoloft were ordered for him. These medications will be followed by Dr. Ed Collins. 
DAYSPRING TREATMENT COURSE 
Following a full-scale evaluation, the patient was discharged from treatment on 09/12/95. Following an 
in-depth meeting with his wife, his physician (Dr. Middleton), and myself, (Rick Garrett, clinical 
counselor), the decision was reached that the patient would be returned to his hometown with his wife, 
where he will continue his medical practice. He has been referred to the Diversion Committee, and in 
fact met with the Diversion Committee while here on the Dayspring Unit. An initial interview has been 
set up with them, and they will likely be following this case. The patient has also been referred for 
one-to-one therapy with Dr. Edgar Collins, and an initial therapy session with Dr. Collins has been 
scheduled for Friday, September 22, 1995, at 3 p.m. at the Professional Office Building here at Wasatch 
Canyons Hospital. 
Because of financial reasons that necessitate the patient returning to work as quickly as possible, it was 
felt that the structure that will be provided by the Diversion Committee in association with the one-to-one 
therapy would be a reasonable treatment plan for this patient. He is a surgeon in the Vernal, Utah, area. 
Having cleared the chemical dependency evaluation here at Dayspring, he is being allowed to return to 
work now. 
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CONSULTATION 
REASON FOR CONSULTATION 
Psychiatry was asked to see this 50-year-old, married, white, male orthopedic surgeon, father of ten, and 
Vietnam veteran, who had been admitted to Wasatch Canyons Hospital Dayspring Program on 09-07-95 as 
arranged per Dr. Ray Middieton for evaluation in regards to the patient's use of analgesics. He uses for control 
of headaches and orthopedic injuries suffered in a helicopter crash during service in Vietnam. 
Because the patient also has a history of depression and has been on various antidepressant medications, 
psychiatry was asked to make an evaluation, along with recommendations for treatment. 
HISTORY OF THE PRESENT ILLNESS 
Approximately three and a half hours were spent obtaining the following information, which will be abbreviated 
in this report. 
In 1968 the patient was serving as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam. He and a small crew aboard his helicopter 
were asked to rescue a small band of men stranded on a hillside in the thick of battle. The rescue took place 
under fire. Nine injured men were loaded aboard the helicopter under extremely difficult circumstances. The 
helicopter was extensively damaged by enemy gunfire. Despite the patient's best efforts as pilot, the helicopter 
crashed. He was the lone survivor, but suffered extensive injuries including burns, fractures of his neck, back, 
ankle, and ribs. He was rescued and treated. He spent approximately a year convalescing. 
Despite his injuries and associated pain, he was able to complete medical school, residency training in 
orthopedic surgery, and sub-specialty in pediatric orthopedics. 
Opiate derivative analgesics were utilized for control of episodic pain and after procedures and surgeries of his 
neck, back and ankle in attempts to improve function and decrease pain. These were not completely successful 
and he describes one surgery to his neck as resulting in complications including Horner's syndrome and 
vagotomy. 
He continues to complain of headaches, which were worsened recently when he bumped his head while working 
on his car. Recent episodes of misuse of medications resulting in excessive sedation and inappropriate 
behaviors in public, i.e., falling asleep in a theater requiring his 17-year-old son to help him up out of the 
theater and home. Also recently falling off his horse while riding over to see a high school football game. 
Patient admits to having taken medications prior to both these episodes, but is vague as to which medications 
and the amounts. 
Most of the patient's medical career has been in the Service. After retirement he worked for awhile in Salt 
Lake City, then opening a practice in Vernal, Utah. He describes doing well, but was recalled into the Service 
during the Gulf War. He states that this became a financial burden in that there was a marked change in 
income. He now describes significant financial problems, including problems with the IRS. 
According to the patient he has been diagnosed with major depression, along with post traumatic stress disorder 
in the past. He has been treated at various times by psychologists for therapy and a psychiatrist for medications 
during the patient's career in the military. His most recent psychotropic medications have included Zoloft and 
trazodone. 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
MCMI-III: The profile appears to be valid. Patient does have a very high score, however, on the 
Desirability Scale, indicating that his answers may have been influenced by a desire to be liked or present 
a positive image. Among Axis I Scales, the patient demonstrated elevations on post traumatic stress disorder 
and somatoform disorder scales. 
Among Axis II diagnoses, the patient demonstrated a depressive personality disorder with histrionic and 
compulsive features. 
Suicide Probability Scale: The SPS is significant for very high levels of hostility. The patient is a mild risk 
for suicide according to this instrument. 
Beck Depression Inventory: The BDI indicates a mild mood disturbance. Somatic symptoms (problems 
sleeping, with fatigue, decreased appetite, health problems) are prominent. 
Alcohol Readiness for Change Inventory: This scale indicates that the patient is currently in an action 
oriented mode, indicating that he at least is reporting that he is ready to take steps towards treating his 
current problem. 
CLINICAL INTERVIEW 
The patient indicates that he has come to treatment because he believes he "recognizes signs" that he is an 
addict, and does not want this to precipitate problems in his marriage and life. There is no history of early 
problems with learning or attention deficit disorder. Family history is positive for alcoholism and depression. 
Patient reports that he was involved in at least two serious accidents. The first occurred when he was about 
18 years old.. He was in the back of a pickup truck which hit a tree. Patient reports that he was the only 
survivor from among five passengers. In the second case, the patient was flying a helicopter in 1968 in 
Vietnam and was shot down. He received back and leg injuries when the helicopter crashed, and suffered 
severe burns when the helicopter exploded. He was, however, thrown free and again was the only survivor 
from among about 13 other passengers and patients. Patient reports long history of feeling lonely and 
depressed. He indicates that he has always considered "suicide as an option," but does not believe he has 
ever been a danger to himself. He denies that he is a danger to himself at this time. Patient appears to 
have post traumatic stress disorder secondary to his experiences in Vietnam. He has repetitive recurring 
nightmares times two (seeing a young girl die from a grenade explosion and seeing a village massacre in 
which the Viet Cong apparently came into the village and eviscerated 30+ children). He has been treated 
for post traumatic stress disorder, and has had a number of treatment trials of antidepressants. He indicates 
that when he has been on trazodone that it is a very effective antidepressant for him. 
SEVERITY / JUSTIFICATION 
The patient's substance abuse has caused significant occupational, family, psychological, and interpersonal 
problems. These problems have been severe enough to require treatment in a structured inpatient or 
outpatient rehabilitation program at this time. The patient is a mild risk to himself according to the Suicide 
Probability Scale. 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSION 
AXIS I Opiate Abuse and Dependence 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Moderate, Continuous 
AXIS II Depressive Personality Disorder With Compulsive and Histrionic Features 
AXIS III See Medical History and Physical: Multiple Physical Problems Secondary to his Injury in 
Vietnam 
AXIS IV Problems: Psychological, Family, Occupational, Substance Abuse, Financial 
AXISV GAF: 55-60 
TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. A structured inpatient program would appear to be most beneficial for the patient at this time. 
During his treatment the patient should participate in individual therapy, group therapy, and didactic 
lectures to address the issues surrounding substance abuse and to gain an education in addiction. 
Family therapy would also be an important part of treatment. Treatments geared towards improved 
self-esteem, improved coping and problem solving abilities, stress management, appropriate anger 
management, assertiveness, and improved communication skills may be helpful for this patient. 
"Supportive relationships with AA and/or NA should be established. 
2. The patient has moderate, continuous post traumatic stress disorder. He should consider counseling 
for this problem. Sometimes patients with depressive symptoms secondary to post traumatic stress 
disorder respond to older antidepressants which tend to be more sedating since sleep disturbance 
secondary to nightmares is often a significant problem. Patient reports that he has done well on 
trazodone in the past, and this medication, or possibly nortriptyline, may be considered. Individual 
counseling for post traumatic stress disorder may also be worth considering. 
3. Patient has extensive experience with various pain programs. He does appear to do well when 
actively enrolled, and referral to Pain Clinic or concurrent treatment, might be considered. 
4. By patient's report he has not engaged in aggressive, active program of physical therapy. 
Participation in programs such as the Spine Clinic at Cottonwood Hospital may also be considered. 
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DAYSPRING QUESTIONNAIRE ABOUT DRINKING & DRUG 
Do you feel you are a normal drinker, cr that ycur use cf 
drugs is normal? 
Have you awakened the morning after some drinking or drug 
use the night before and found that you could not 
remember a part of the evening before? 
Does your spouse (or parents) ever worry or complain 
about your drinking or drug use? 
Car. you stop drinking or using d^ugs without a struggle? 
Do you ever feel bad about your drinking or drug use? 
Do friends or relatives think you are a normal drinker or 
that your use of drugs is normal? 
Are you always able to stop drinking or using drugs when 
you want to? 
Have you ever attended a meeting of Alcoholics Anonymous 
(AA) or Narcotics Anonymous? 
Have you ever gotten into fights while drinking cr using 
drugs? 
Has your drinking or drug use ever caused problems with 
you and your spouse? 
Has your spouse (or any other family member) ever gone 
for help about your drinking cr drug use? 
Have you ever lost friends or girlfriends/boyfriends 
because of ycur drinking cr drug use? 
Have you ever gotten into trouble at work because of your 
drinking or drug use? 
Have you ever lost a job because of your drinking or drug 
u?e? 
Have you ever neglected your obligations, your family, or 
your work for two or more days in a row because of ycur 
drinking or drug use? 
Do you drink or use drugs before noon fairly often? 
Have you ever been told that you have liver trouble cr 
cirrhosis? 
Have you ever had delirium tremens (DT's), severe 
shaking, heard voices, or seen things that weren't there 
after drinking or drug use? 
Have you ever -gone to anyone for help about your drinking 
or drug use? 
Have you ever been in a hospital because of your drinking 
or drug use? 
y-v -zo-To ensure that issues important to my treatment do not go untreated, Wasatch Canyons Hospital is providing m 
with a referral to: /fah ^ ^ / f / - e ^ ^ J^fc e ^ ^ £ / Z ^ 
In £<{<& r Oo/f/n Name:. •4 •far Lc/f/ S 
—7 • / . 
Agency: (A/<A£&ft £ C # ^ / 7 / i , ; /flft/><T*/ ('&^/*»^ Jjy Lo</nsr:/fnf 
Address: ^7?o. £u /SH* 4 > ^ / SCTJ (tf~ TVf^l 
Phone: c*sr -g /<?9 
I am being referred for treatment of: v^r^/ox/
 ; r / Si) 
I hereby grant permission to Wasatch Canyons Hospital to contact the individual/Or agency listed above to determine 
whether client contact occurred as planned and whether referral was ^XMSM&S^ 
Witness: 
Name: 
ACCEPTING INDIVIDUAL OR AGENCY 
T Agency: tiJwfi*nr& C&~"?fr-t / ^ ^ T V Qfr\/&-~ Js^ fnu*je/s*j 
Address: ^77d $*. ASlTO 6*s*jr* S(£ o/m V9/+I 
Phone: ^r-S/of 
was referred to you for treatmen 
of 
In order to maintain an adequate record of our client's continuing treatment, we request the following information 
1. Did client contact you and make an appointment? • Yes • No 
2. If so, did client keep his/her appointment? • Yes • No 
3. Was it appropriate that this client was referred to you for treatment? • Yes • No 
Why or why not? 
4. Was your agency able to meet the client's need for assistance? Q Yes • No 
Why or why not? 
Thank you for your timely response. 
m WASATCH CANYONS HOSPITAL REFERRAL / FOLLOW-UP 
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Tab 3 
ojjtvmv. v*' in 10 miormation Lxchange and Conditu or Consideration 
in Connection with 
IHC Appointment/Reappointment, Employment, and/or Participation. 
I am applying or reapplying for medical staff membership, clinical privileges, employment, or panel participation 
at one or more IHC facilities, entities, operations, or services. The scope of such application or reapplication is determined 
by other documents. Such application(s) or reapplication(s) involve an IHC hospital, some other facility or operation of 
IHC Health Services, Inc., the IHC Physician Division, and/or IHC Health Plans and its affiliated companies. Such IHC 
facilities, entities, operations, and services, together with their medical staff(s) or equivalent provider organizations, and their 
governing boards, officers, administrators, and employees, are referred to in this document as "IHC entities" or singly as 
an "IHC entity." I understand that IHC entities are required to compile information so that they can make a fully informed 
decision about me and my relationship or potential relationship with them. This document is intended to facilitate that 
process. For convenience in this document, I refer to the processes of obtaining verification of my credentials, checking 
my background, and of considering me for initial or continuing medical staff membership, clinical privileges, employment, 
or panel participation (as appropriate) as the "Process." I intend that this document apply to the Process in each IHC entity 
to which I am applying or reapplying. I understand that the Process may involve IHC Medical Staff Services providing 
assistance to the IHC entities to which I have applied or reapplied. 
1. I have received or have had the opportunity to request, and I have had the opportunity to read, the medicalstaff 
and hospital bylaws, fair hearing plan, rules and regulations, and/or the other employment or participation 
documents for each IHC entity to which I am applying. I acknowledge that such documents apply to me both in 
connection with the Process and in connection with my medical staff membership, clinical privileges, employment^ 
or panel participation, if granted, for each IHC entity involved. 
2. On all applications) to IHC entities, I have provided true, complete, and accurate information in connection with 
the Process. I represent to each IHC entity that such information provides an accurate, fair, and complete picture 
of my professional background, training, and experience for all the periods of time specified on the forms I have 
filled out I acknowledge that any material omission or misstatement of information on such documents may be 
grounds for terminating my relationship with an IHC entity. 
3. If granted or extended medical staff membership, clinical privileges, employment, and/or panel participation, I agree 
to abide by the bylaws, requirements, rules, and regulations of each IHC entity with which I am involved. I 
understand that my professional practice is subject to state and federal laws and regulations, and that persons, 
institutions, and entities involved in the Process may be protected by state and federal laws designed to encourage 
and protect good faith peer review and quality assurance activities. 
4. I understand that it is necessary for each IHC entity to obtain detailed information about me in order to complete 
the Process. I understand that such information may be private, sensitive, privileged, and otherwise confidential. 
It is my request, and I hereby give my consent, that such information be disclosed to IHC entities and received by 
them in the manner described in this document. 
The information that may be disclosed shall include information about me that bears upon any of the following: 
my education, post-graduate specialty training, board certification, experience, competence, professional conduct, 
ethics, ability to work with others, quality assurance data and information, hospital and other affiliation(s) (such 
as other professional practice settings or participation with other health plans), utilization data, clinical privileges, 
disciplinary actions, malpractice coverage, claims history, judgements and settlements paid, litigation experience, 
state licensure, and controlled substance licensure. I intend that this consent include all information that reflects 
on my ability to safely, competently, and professionally perform the professional activities, employment, and/or 
panel participation I have requested with each IHC entity. 
I intend that this consent extend to all persons, institutions, and entities that have such information about me, 
including: colleges, universities, professional societies, hospitals, specialty boards, practice groups, clinics, insurance 
companies, partnerships, professional corporations, and employers, and to persons and committees associated with 
any of these. In connection with the Process, I also give my consent for all such persons, institutions, and entities 
to express their opinion(s) about me and to make recommendations about my professional skills, conduct, and 
ability to perform the clinical privileges, or job I have applied for. I also give my consent for the IHC entities and 
their medical staffs, officers, agents, committees, and employees involved in the Process to receive and act upon 
all such information, opinions, and recommendations in connection with the Process. 
I recognize that the free exchange of the types of information, opinions, and recommendations identified in this 
document: is a necessary pan of each facility(s) credential ing, recredentialing, privileging, and peer review processes 
I realize, however, that the threat of litigation and liability tends, as a practical matter, to discourage the exchange 
of these types of information. As a result, it is my purpose and intention to induce and encourage others to do 
the things identified in this document by removing the threat of litigation and liability as a result of their good 
faith actions to provide information to the Process on my behalf. To that end, I intend that the p^nnc 
institutions, and entities identified above will rely on this document as my consent to their actionfe) and as my 
release from liability and promise not to subjea them to legal claims and lawsuits as a result of their good faith 
efforts to do the things described in this document, which I acknowledge to be for my benefit to facilitate th<* 
Process. I intend that this paragraph will apply both to persons, institutions, and entities supplying information, 
opinions, and recommendations to the facility(s), medical staff(s) and to all persons, committees, and entities 
involved in the Process for the facility(s), medical staff(s) and IHC Health Plans. 
I understand that signing this document is an important part of the Process and that any change in this document 
as provided to me will cause my application or request to be incomplete and will delay the Process. 
I intend that a copy of this document may be relied upon as if it were the original. 
Printed Name 
DrThnma ^ 4 ^c?^ / f^ 
Address 
Thomas A. Hawkes M.D. 
Pediatric & Adult Orthopedic Surgery 
175 North 100 West #204 
Vernal. Utah 84078 
